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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District Court. The
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Sections 78A-3-103(2)(e), and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to exclude
evidence of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts, which led to his conviction
for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, under rule 404(b)
of the
Utah Rules of Evidence? The admission of evidence under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion; however, "admission of prior crimes evidence itself
must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper
exercise of that discretion." State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 843
(Utah 1999).
II.

Did the trial court incorrectly sentence Mr. Losee by failing to
apply the Solicitation statute applicable to Mr. Losee at the time of
his sentencing? In other words, because the Solicitation statute
was amended after Mr. Losee was charged but before he was
sentenced, was he entitled to be punished for a Second Degree
Felony? Whether defendants are entitled to a lesser sentence when
the legislature reduces the penalty for the crime charged before
sentencing is a question of law. State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 138
(Utah App. 1996).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Art.l, Section 10.
Utah Constitution, Art. 1, Section 18.
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Utah Code Ann. 76-1-103.
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.
Utah Code Ann. 76-4-203.
Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204.
Utah Code Ann. 76-5-202.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken from the final order and judgment of the Third
District Court, the Honorable Terry L. Christiansen presiding. (Second
Supplemental Index of Record (hereinafter, "Index of Record"), pp. 508-9.)
Mr. Losee was charged November 13, 2006 by information with one
count of Solicitation to Commit Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder, a
First Degree Felony. (Index of Record, pp. 1-5.) An Amended Information
with the same charge was filed December 19, 2006. (Index of Record, pp.
241-43.) A Second Amended Information alleging the same charge was filed
April 1, 2008. (Index of Record, pp. 361-63.) A Motion in Limine seeking to
suppress evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crime was filed by Mr. Losee on
March 14, 2007. (Index of Record, pp. 112-14.) The State filed a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine on June 1,
2007. (Index of Record, pp. 168-89 and 517-38.) Mr. Losee's Reply to
State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine was
filed June 15, 2007. (Index of Record, pp. 190-96.) Judge Christiansen filed
on July 31, 2007, a Memorandum Decision regarding the evidentiary issues
raised in the Motion in Limine. (Index of Record, pp. 205-12.)
A four-day jury trial was held April 1, 2008 through April 4, 2008.
(Index of Record, pp. 413-14, 433-35, 439-40, and 441-42.) The jury found
Mr. Losee guilty of Solicitation to Commit Homicide, Aggravated Murder.
(Index of Record, p. 576; and Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, page 66, lines 4-6.)
On July 15, 2008, Mr. Losee was sentenced to five years to life in prison, to
run consecutively to the five years to life sentence he was already serving.
(Index of Record, p. 571; and Sentencing Transcript, page 39, lines 12-15.)
A timely notice of appeal was filed July 16, 2008. (Index of Record,
p. 511-12.)

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Oral argument was held June 21, 2007 regarding Mr. Losee's Motion
in Limine seeking to exclude evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes. (Index
of Record, p. 572.) The trial court took the matter under advisement and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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eventually filed a written Memorandum Decision allowing the admission of
the evidence Mr. Losee sought to exclude. (Index of Record, pp. 205-212.)
At trial, defendant's counsel renewed his objection to evidence of Mr.
Losee's prior crimes. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 15, lines 9-21.)
Because this evidence was ruled admissible, the State spent some time
in its opening argument going into the details of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts
and related crimes, telling the jury that during a prior incident on May 9,
2006, Mr. Losee fired "at least 14 rounds from his firearm into [Becky
Underwood's] door." (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 18-19, lines 14-14.) The
jury also was told Mr. Losee held Ms, Underwood "hostage and at gunpoint
for over an hour." (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, p. 19, line 15.) During opening
argument, the jury also was shown a photograph of the bullet holes left in
the door to Ms. Underwood's apartment as a result of Mr. Losee's prior
criminal acts. (Trial transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 19-20, lines 23-1.)
During the trial, the jury was presented with detailed evidence
regarding Mr. Losee's prior bad acts of May 9, 2006. The jury heard Ms.
Underwood describe that May 9, 2006 episode. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p.
18, beginning at line 8.) The jury also listened to portions of the harrowing
9-1-1 call made by Ms. Underwood during Mr. Losee's crime on May 9,
2006. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 26-28.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ms. Underwood told the jury that on May 9, 2006 she invited to her
home a man named Ryan Crocker. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 23, lines 1420.) Mr. Losee, who Ms. Underwood said fancied himself as her boyfriend,
showed up during dinner, uninvited. Ms. Underwood invited Mr. Losee into
her home. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 21, line 20 and pp. 23-24, lines 25-4.)
According to Ms. Underwood, Mr. Losee got upset sometime after he
"drank a couple of wine coolers and his whole demeanor changed." So, she
asked him to leave. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 24, lines 12-17.) Eventually,
Ms. Underwood decided to go to bed. "Next thing I heard was gunshots
through my front door." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 25, lines 8-11.) Portions
of the audiotape of Ms. Underwood's 9-1-1 call were played for the jury.
(Trial transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 26-28.) On these tapes, the jury heard Ms.
Underwood talking to the 9-1-1 operator. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 26,
lines 20-22.) On the recording, a terrified Ms. Underwood tells the operator,
"I've got somebody breaking into my front door." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call,
p. 2, lines 5-6.) An angry male voice, not identified at this point, but
presumably Mr. Losee, is heard to say, "You're a fucking whore."
(Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 2, line 20.) Ms. Underwood exclaims, "He's got
a loaded gun." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 2, line 24.) The male voice can
be heard responding, "I'm going to fucking kill you. ... You'd better bring a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fucking army because she's going down." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 3,
lines 1-2.) Later, Ms. Underwood exclaims, "He's got a gun that he's
shooting with." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 3, lines 20-21.) The male voice
again, "You're going to die." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 4, line 17.) Ms.
Underwood identifies the male speaker as Karl Losee. (Transcript of 9-1-1
Call, pp. 4-5, lines 24-4.) Ms. Underwood later exclaims, "He's pointing the
fucking gun at me." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 5, lines 12-13.) The
operator asks, "Is he threatening to kill officers and you?" Ms. Underwood
answers, "Just me right now, and my other friend that's here." (Transcript of
9-1-1 Call, p. 6, lines 14-17.) Male voice: "If they come in the door they're
going to fucking die." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 7, lines 2-3.) Male voice
to Ms. Underwood: "I'm shooting through you too. ... You're going to die."
(Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 7, lines 12-16.) Male voice, again: "You're
going to fucking die." Ms. Underwood, "What did I do?" Male voice, "You
screwed a fucking guy. You're a fucking cunt." (Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p.
8, lines 17-24.) Later still, a scared Ms. Underwood tells the operator, Mr.
Losee is "[h]ere with me with a gun pointed right here at me." (Transcript of
9-1-1 Call, p. 11, lines 15-17.) Male speaker: "Don't tell me what I will and
will not do. You whining motherfucker. I'm going to shoot you in the back."
(Transcript of 9-1-1 Call, p. 12, lines 21-22.)
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After listening to the 9-1-1 tape with the jury, Ms. Underwood
continued testifying about the May 9, 2006 incident. She told the jury that
Mr. Losee fired his gun "directly above my head. ... There were powder
burns all over my face." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 29, lines 15-19.)
At trial, Andre Pendleton testified that Mr. Losee asked him to
arrange for Ms. Underwood's murder. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 68, lines 25.) This solicitation allegedly occurred sometime in the fall of 2006. (Trial
transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 59-60, lines 25-1.) Mr. Pendleton testified that a
message was to be delivered to Ms. Underwood when she was killed: "You
shouldn't have fucked over the little man." (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 71,
lines 16-19.) Mr. Pendleton also testified he heard Mr. Losee use this
jailhouse nickname to refer to himself. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p. 71, lines
22-25.) Mr. Pendleton also testified he received a map from Mr. Losee,
with directions to Ms. Underwood's house. (Trial transcript, Vol. 2, p.67,
lines 14-15.)
On July 15, 2008, based on his first degree felony conviction in this
case, Mr. Losee was sentenced to five years to life in prison, to run
consecutively to the five years to life sentence he was already serving.
(Index of Record, p. 571; and Sentencing Transcript, page 39, lines 12-15.)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of prior
bad acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show he acted
in conformity with that character. Sometimes, evidence of prior bad acts
may be admissible for other purposes, but only if that evidence is relevant to
the case at hand, and only if the probative value of that evidence is not
substantially outweighed by its prejudice to the defendant. Thus, under rule
404(b), evidence of prior bad acts cannot be admitted unless it can be shown
such evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, is relevant
under Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and is not overly
prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
In this case, graphic details of Mr. Losee's prior crimes of aggravated
burglary and aggravated assault were improperly allowed by the trial court.
The evidence was not of a proper, noncharacter kind, was not relevant to the
case at hand, and was substantially more prejudicial to the defendant than it
was probative of any element of the crime being adjudicated. The highly
inflammatory evidence regarding Mr. Losee's prior crimes robbed Mr.
Losee of a fair trial. It was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to allow
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this evidence, and without such evidence, it is likely Mr. Losee would not
have been convicted.
Secondly, because the aggravated murder statute was amended after
the occurrence of Mr. Losee's alleged solicitation for the murder of Ms.
Underwood, but before he was sentenced, he is entitled to be punished under
the new penalty as a result of that amendment. Because the amendment
changed the penalty for Mr. Losee's alleged solicitation from a first degree
felony to a second degree felony, Mr. Losee is entitled to be punished under
the terms of a second degree felony. It makes no difference that the
solicitation statute was later amended, after Mr. Losee's trial but before his
sentencing, to re-classify Mr. Losee's crime as a first degree felony, because
application of such an ex post facto law is barred by the constitutions of the
United States and the State of Utah.

ARGUMENT
I.

EVIDENCE OF MR. LOSEE'S EARLIER CRIMES
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED BECAUSE SUCH
EVIDENCE WAS NOT OFFERED FOR A PROPER,
NONCHARACTER PURPOSE, WAS NOT RELEVANT TO
THE CASE AT HAND, AND WAS UNFAIRLY
PREJUDICIAL TO MR. LOSEE.
Details of Mr. Losee's prior crimes is exactly the kind of

overwhelmingly unfair evidence the rules of evidence seek to exclude from a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jury's attention, because it is the kind of evidence that "tends to skew and
corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d
291, 295 (Utah 1988).
Such evidence, according to Dean Wigmore, "is objectionable not
because it has no appreciable probative value but because it has too much."
Id- (Citing, with approval, 1A J. Wigmore, "Evidence in Trials at Common
Law," Section 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983).)
An "abuse of discretion" standard of review applies to evidentiary
rulings under rule 404(b). Decorso, at 843. However, "admission of prior
crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the
proper exercise of that discretion." Id.
Because Mr. Losee's prior crimes were so spectacularly horrifying,
the facts surrounding those crimes could do nothing but skew and corrupt
the jury's efforts in the trial below.
Whether evidence of prior bad acts is admissible is subject to rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The rule provides, in relevant part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
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When analyzing whether particular evidence is admissible under rule
404(b), a court must undertake a three-part analysis. First, the court must
determine whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter
purpose. Second, the court must determine whether such evidence is
relevant (under Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence). Finally,
the court must determine whether the evidence should be excluded because
it is more prejudicial than probative (Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence). State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 843 (Utah 1999). See also, State
v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988); State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424,
(Utah 1989); and State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139 (Utah App. 2002).
a. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes was not offered for a
proper, noncharacter purpose.
"If the court determines that the evidence is being offered only to
show the defendant's propensity to commit crime, then it is inadmissible and
must be excluded." Id.
The trial court's analysis in this case is off the mark in finding that
evidence of Mr. Losee's previous crime is admissible for the noncharacter
purpose of motive. At first blush, the trial court's reasoning seems
persuasive. (But see, State v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah App. 2001),
wherein the court applied the reasoning of Decorso to the State's claimed
need for prior crimes evidence to show defendant's identity and intent. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Webster court found the State's claims wanting, and concluded that the
admission of prior crimes evidence was harmful error, in part because the
court had not engaged in a scrupulous examination of the prior crimes
evidence before allowing it into evidence.)
Here, the trial court found Mr. Losee's prior acts were fueled by his
alleged animosity and emotion toward Ms. Underwood. The trial court also
found that Mr. Losee's extreme emotion was still lingering by the time Mr.
Losee allegedly solicited Ms. Underwood's murder some five months later.
The trial court then ruled that Mr. Losee's prior bad acts "establish this
emotional motive in a way no other evidence available to the State can."
Memorandum Decision, pp. 4-5.
The trial court's own findings undermine its assertion the State had no
other evidence regarding Mr. Losee's "emotional motive." The trial court
presumed the testimony of Andre Pendleton, noting, "Defendant's parting
message to Ms. Underwood - the last thing that Defendant wanted her to
hear, [sic] was an emotionally-charged statement through which she would
know who had killed her." Memorandum Decision at 5-6. This statement that, according to Mr. Pendleton, Ms. Underwood was to be told, "you
shouldn't have fucked over the little man" — certainly can convey an
emotional motive without the concurrent he's-a-bad-guy-who-alreadyDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

kidnapped-and-assaulted-Ms. Underwood-with-a-gun undertones of the
prior bad acts evidence.
Furthermore, to focus on Mr. Losee's emotional state during the
commission of his prior crimes is to miss the point. As the Featherson court
noted, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the other acts have 'clearly
probative value with respect to the intent of the accused at the time of the
offense charged?" Id. at 429-30 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
The Featherson court was discussing the issue of remoteness in time from
the prior crime to the crime at issue in trial, but its point is equally relevant
here. The statements allegedly made by Mr. Losee to Mr. Pendleton are
much more relevant to Mr. Losee's state of mind at the time of the alleged
solicitation for which he was being tried in this matter than are his state of
mind and actions of May, 2006.
It is simply error to assign a proper, noncharacter motive to admission
of evidence Mr. Losee's prior crimes.

b. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts is simply not relevant to
the case at trial.
"[U]nless the other crimes evidence tends to prove some fact that is
material to the crime charged - other than the defendant's propensity to
commit crime - it is irrelevant and should be excluded by the court pursuant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to rule 402." Decorso, at 844. See also Featherson, at 426 (facts regarding
prior crimes "must be material to the crime charged" before they are
admissible).
" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. And, "[a]ll relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible." Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Mr. Losee was on trial for his alleged solicitation of Ms. Underwood's
murder sometime in the fall of 2006, not his admitted aggravated burglary
and aggravated assault which occurred in May, 2006. The earlier events
have no bearing on the State's proof of the elements of the solicitation of
murder charge. To be guilty of solicitation, a defendant must (1) intend that
a felony be committed when he (2) solicits, requests, commands, offers to
hire, or importunes another (3) to engage in specific conduct the defendant
believes would be a felony. Utah Code Ann. 76-4-203(1) (1993).
Furthermore, the solicitation must be "made under circumstances strongly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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corroborative of the [defendant's] intent that the offense be committed. Utah
Code Ann. 76-4-203(2) (1993).
The events of May, 2006 simply have no bearing on Mr. Losee's
intent at the time he allegedly solicited Ms. Underwood's murder some five
months later. Mr. Losee's earlier crimes do not have any bearing on the
specific conduct sought by Mr. Losee when he sat in jail during the fall of
2006, and they can shed no light on whether or not he believed he was
asking Mr. Pendleton commit a felony. Thus, the facts surrounding Mr.
Losee's prior crimes of May, 2006 are not relevant, and are not admissible
under rule 402.

c. Evidence of Mr. Losee's prior bad acts is prejudicial, and
substantially outweighs any probative value to the State's
solicitation case.
Evidence of prior crimes is not admissible if it is "substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury." Decorso, at 844. Furthermore,
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of
matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as
to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree
to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering
hostility.
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Id., quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (emphasis
supplied).
It is undeniable that the evidence is strong regarding Mr. Losee's prior
bad acts of May, 2006. Mr. Losee pleaded guilty to crimes of aggravated
burglary and aggravated assault. Some of his most outrageous behavior was
recorded in the 9-1-1 call made by Ms. Underwood. His behavior was
witnessed by police. However, under the analysis of both Shickles and
Bradley (which follows Shickles), even where there is strong proof of the
prior crime, prior crimes evidence also must be strongly probative of the
defendant's intent to commit the latter crime which is the subject at trial.
Here, evidence of Mr. Losee's prior aggravated burglary and aggravated
assault is not probative of his intent to commit the charged crime of
solicitation of murder. Without such a connection, evidence of his prior
crimes is inadmissible. (See, discussion of Shickles factors four and five,
below.)
Furthermore, this factor is but one of six. When all the factors are
looked at scrupulously, it becomes obvious the evidence of Mr. Losee's
prior bad acts should have been excluded. Additionally, the trial court only
seems to have looked closely at this factor and the second factor regarding
similarities between the prior crimes and his crime. And, the trial court got
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its analysis of the second factor wrong, assessing "commonality" instead of
the similarities between the two criminal episodes.
Mr. Losee's prior crimes and the crime at trial are dissimilar as two
crimes can be. It is not enough to conclude, as the trial court did, "that these
separate crimes were perpetrated against the same victim, for arguably a
common reason and outcome[, thus] completing] the commonality
element." Memorandum Decision at 7. In Decorso the similarity relied on
was the court's earlier finding that the prior crime and the instant crime were
so alike as to be "signature-like." Id. at 845. In Bradley, the court found "a
significant similarity between" the prior sex abuse crimes against a different
victim, who was a sibling to the victims in the instant trial, and "those
perpetrated against" those sibling victims. Id. at 1147. That finding was
based upon the defendant's use of "a similar methodology and plan" in
abusing both prior and current victims. Id.
As these cases make clear, to support admission of prior bad acts, the
instant crime and the prior bad acts must be so strikingly similar in nature
that evidence of the former is evidence of the latter. There is simply no such
similarity between Mr. Losee's prior acts and the actions which led to the
charge of solicitation against him.
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The prior crime was a crime of extreme emotion, occurring in an
impassioned and drunken state without any clearheaded forethought. There
most certainly was not any of the deliberate and calculating effort to commit
a murder that is the hallmark of solicitation. Solicitation regards a businesslike, contractual arrangement which requires much thought and planning
before it can be consummated.
Third, the interval of time elapsed between Mr. Losee's dissimilar
criminal episodes - the prior crimes aggravated burglary and aggravated
assault and the alleged solicitation of murder at issue in this trial minimizes the probative value of the evidence. The five months that elapsed
between Mr. Losee's violent, frightening May, 2006 outburst and the alleged
quiet, business-like solicitation of September sap the former of any
reasonable relationship to the latter. As already noted above, the Featherson
court weighed in on this very issue: "Remoteness refers to the time between
the prior crime and the offense for which the accused is on trial, but the test
for remoteness is not a mechanical application. The relevant inquiry is
whether the other acts have 'clearly probative value with respect to the intent
of the accused at the time of the offense charged.'" Id. at 430 (emphasis in
original). Thus, it doesn't matter so much how much time has passed, as
how that time has passed.
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As noted by the Bradley court, "proximity in time [combined with]
similarity" to the prior bad acts make evidence of the prior acts "highly
probative." Id. at 1147. Here, no such link exists. Time has severed almost
completely the prior crimes from the charged crime. There is no common
scheme between the prior crimes and the charged crime; there are precious
few common facts between the prior crime and the charged crime (the key
victim is the same); there is no relationship between the alleged motives
(drunken jealousy vs. revenge); the intent is different (angrily and
emotionally terrorizing a victim he "loves" vs. killing a victim with whom
Mr. Losee's relationship has been severed); one is a crime of opportunity
(have scooter and gun, will travel), while the other is a crime of preparation
and planning (hence, the alleged drawing of a map to help a hired killer find
the victim).
Fourth, the prosecution did not need the evidence of Mr. Losee's prior
crimes to try to prove the solicitation charge. Where "[t]here was sufficient
evidentiary proof to show that all the elements of the charged crimes had
been satisfied[,] [introduction of all prior misconduct and convictions was
unnecessary." Featherson at 431.
Here, the State could show sufficient facts to make out the elements of
the charged crime of solicitation of murder. Mr. Pendleton provided
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testimony regarding Mr. Losee's intent that Ms. Underwood be murdered.
Mr. Pendleton also provided testimony that Mr. Losee solicited him to kill
Ms. Underwood, or find somebody else to hire to kill her. Mr. Pendleton's
testimony could be used by the State to show the solicitation of Ms.
Underwood's murder was made under circumstances strongly corroborative
of Mr. Losee's intent the murder actually be consummated. The map Mr.
Pendleton produced also supports the State's case on the elements of
solicitation.
Fifth, the court is required to look into the efficacy of the alternative
proof. As discussed above, the alternative proof available to the State is
enough to make out the elements of the case. The trial court failed to
explore the State's need for prior crimes evidence, or the efficacy of that
alternative evidence to the State's case. This failure to address the issue of
alternative evidence is, accordingly, a failure to meet its mandate to
"scrupulously examine" the admissibility of prior crimes evidence.
Further, the requirement that the availability and efficacy of
alternative evidence be explored by the trial court when assessing the
admissibility of prior crimes evidence cannot mean the State is entitled to
that evidence simply because it doesn't have a good case without it. That
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would make the prohibition of unfairly prejudicial evidence a barren
prohibition at best.
There is alternative proof in the solicitation case against Mr. Losee.
The State may have been unsure of its alternative proof against Mr. Losee
because, after all, its evidence comes primarily from a pair of jailhouse
snitches who had much to gain, earning better deals regarding their own
crimes for their testimony against Mr. Losee. But any perceived weaknesses
in the State's solicitation case against Mr. Losee should not allow the State
to essentially retry him for the prior crime. This is exactly the kind of
intermingling of prior and instant case that "tends to skew and corrupt the
accuracy of the fact-finding process." Shickles, supra.
Under the final Decorso factor, the trial court was to have explored
the degree to which evidence of Mr. Loseefs prior acts would "rouse the jury
to overmastering hostility" toward Mr. Losee. The court failed to
scrupulously explore this issue, superficially noting that while Mr. Losee's
actions of May, 2006 "were undeniably extreme ... these acts were no less
extreme than the actions which led to the charge of Solicitation to Commit
Aggravated Murder." Memorandum Decision, at 7.
To deny the prejudicial effect of Mr. Losee's criminal acts of May,
2006, is to look at those actions while wearing blinders. State v. Mauren 770
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P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), is instructive regarding the prejudicial effect of
evidence likely to create an emotional response in the jury.
In that case, the defendant, who was charged with murder, wrote a
callous, profane letter to the victim's father 38 days after the murder. The
court noted, "because of its shocking display of lack of remorse by
defendant and repulsiveness of expressions toward the victim and her father,
the balance of the letter may well have been highly inflammatory in the eyes
of the jury." Id. at 983. The court ruled that a large portion of the letter
should not have been admitted under rule 403, noting that the inadmissible
parts of the letter "contained little or no relevance to the central issue and
that any relevance ... was clearly outweighed by the danger of 'unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, [and] misleading the jury.' ...
[A]dmission of the entire letter was clearly erroneous." Id. The court
explained later in the decision: "the principle issue for the jury to determine
was his state of mind at the time of the killing. The State had several
witnesses to establish that. ... The balance of the letter, which expresses
defendant's vindictiveness and complete lack of remorse, reflected little or
nothing on his state of mind at the time of the killing" Id. at 986 (emphasis
supplied). In reversing the defendant's conviction, and remanding for a new
trial, the Maurer court noted the letter was addressed by the prosecution in
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its opening and closing arguments, and concluded: "These remarks, together
with the letter, clearly could have provoked an emotional response from the
jury and provoked its instinct to punish or otherwise divert the jury from its
task to determine the mental state of defendant at the time of the killing." Id.
at 987.
The same may be said of the instant case, wherein Mr. Losee's
frightening actions of May, 2006 reflected little or nothing on his state of
mind at the time of his alleged solicitation for murder, and evidence of those
actions of May, 2006 clearly could have provided an emotional response
from the jury, provoking its instinct to punish or otherwise diverting the jury
from the task of determining Mr. Losee's guilt on the solicitation charge.
State v. Pendergrass, 586 P.2d 691 (Mont. 1978), cited with approval
by the Maurer court, is also instructive. In that case, the harrowing
audiotape of a rape victim's 9-1-1 call was admitted over defendant's
objection. In ruling the admission of the tape was reversible error in
violation of rule 403, the court explained:
The tape was highly prejudicial to defendant. ... [I]t contained
emotional and nearly incoherent outpourings of the victim in the
immediate aftermath of a violent crime. These utterances necessarily
induced a feeling of outrage against the defendant and sympathy for
the victim. Undue prejudice against defendant was created and a fair
trial climate was destroyed by this tape.
Id. at 694.
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Here, the trial court allowed the jury to hear, over Mr. Losee's
objection, a portion of the highly emotional 9-1-1 call by Ms. Underwood
not regarding the crime which the jury was to decide, but regarding Mr.
Losee'sprior crimes. In other words, the 9-1-1 call played in the trial below
was utterly lacking any of the relevance of the 9-1-1 tape played in
Pendergrass, while carrying all of the emotional baggage which "necessarily
induced" in the jury a feeling of outrage against Mr. Losee and sympathy for
the victim. Such feelings surely prejudiced Mr. Losee and destroyed any
hope he had of a fair trial climate.
There is no question the prejudicial weight of Mr. Losee's prior
crimes substantially outweighs the minimal probative value the evidence had
to the solicitation charge against Mr. Losee. Because Mr. Losee's prior
crimes were so dissimilar to the alleged solicitation in the instant case,
because the interval between the prior crimes and the instant crime severed
almost any connection between the two, because the State had available
effective alternative proof, and because evidence of Mr. Losee's prior crimes
was substantially more prejudicial than it was minimally probative of
solicitation to commit murder, evidence of his prior crimes should not have
been admitted. To admit this evidence was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.
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II.

EVEN IF THIS COURT UPHOLDS THE VERDICT
REACHED BY THE JURY, MR. LOSEE IS ENTITLED TO
THE LESSER PENALTY AFFORDED BY THE AMENDED
AGGRAVATAED MURDER STATUTE BECAUSE THE
AMENDMENT WAS MADE EFFECTIVE SUBSEQUENT
TO MR. LOSEE'S COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE AND
PRIOR TO HIS SENTENCING
Because the legislature amended the aggravated murder statute after

Mr. Losee's offense, but prior to his sentencing, Mr. Losee is entitled to the
lesser penalty afforded by the amended statute. State v. Yates, 918 P.2d
136, 138 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). Whether a defendant is
entitled to a lesser sentence when the legislature reduces the penalty for the
crime charged prior to sentencing presents a "question of law" which this
court reviews "for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's
conclusions." Id.
Mr. Losee was charged November 13, 2006 by information with one
count of Solicitation to Commit Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder, a
First Degree Felony. The allegation remained the same when an Amended
Information was filed December 19, 2006, and a Second Amended
Information was filed April 1, 2008, on the first day of trial.
The aggravated murder statute under which Mr. Losee was originally
charged defined aggravated murder as a "capital felony." Utah Code Ann.
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76-5-202(2) (2005). The criminal solicitation statute in effect at the time of
Mr. Losee's alleged offense described the penalty to be applied to Mr.
Losee's crime: "Criminal solicitation to commit... a capital felony is a first
degree felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(1) (1990). The aggravated
murder statute was amended in 2007. That amendment created two
definitions of aggravated murder. Under the first definition, it remained a
capital offense. Under the definition applicable to Mr. Losee's offense,
aggravated murder became "a noncapital first degree felony." Utah Code
Ann. 76-5-202(3)(a)&(b) (2007).1 Because of the amendment to the
aggravated murder statute, Mr. Losee's crime became a first degree felony
that was reclassified under the solicitation statute as "a first degree felony is
a second degree felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(2) (1990). As a result of
these amendments, which occurred before Mr. Losee was sentenced, Mr.
Losee is entitled to be sentenced for a second degree felony, not the first
degree felony under which he was sentenced.

The relevant language of the amended statute is: (a) If a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated murder is a capital felony,
(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has not been filed,
aggravated murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for life without parole or by an indeterminate term of not less
than 20 years and which may be for life." No notice of intent to seek the
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This remains true even though the criminal solicitation statute itself
was amended and took effect after Mr. Losee's April, 2008 trial but before
he was actually sentenced on July 15, 2008. Effective May 5, 2008, the
criminal solicitation statute was amended, at least in part, to reflect the
changed language of the aggravated murder statute. The new solicitation
statute again reclassified Mr. Losee's crime: "Criminal solicitation to
commit... a felony punishable by imprisonment for life without parole, is a
first degree felony." Utah Code Ann. 76-4-204(1 )(a) (2008).
However, this amendment to the criminal solicitation statute is
inapplicable to Mr. Losee's case. Because application of the amended
criminal solicitation statute to Mr. Losee's case would increase his
punishment, it violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws found in
the Utah and United States constitutions. U.S. Const. Art. 1, Section 10; and
Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 18.
"An ex post facto law is one that punishes as a crime an act previously
committed, which ... makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime,
after its commission." State v. Norton, 675 P. 2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983)
(citations omitted).
Finally, even though counsel did not raise this sentencing issue below,
this Court can address the matter of Mr. Losee's sentencing because the
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failure of the trial court to make the proper sentence under applicable law is
plain error. "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may
not be raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 10 P. 3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000).
However, the plain error doctrine creates an exception to this general rule:
The plain error exception enables an appellate court to 'balance the
need for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.' 'At
bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [an appellate court]
to avoid injustice.' To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must
establish that '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the [outcome] is
undermined.
Id. Under Utah's sentencing structure, the penalties for a first degree felony
and a second degree felony differ substantially. The punishment for a first
degree felony is an indeterminate sentence of five years to life in prison.
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-203(1). The punishment for a second degree
felony is an indeterminate sentence of one to 15 years in prison. Utah Code
Ann. Section 76-3-203(2). It is clearly an injustice for Mr. Losee to be
punished under the harsher first degree felony requirement simply because
the trial court failed to notice a change in the statute applying to his case,
and because counsel failed to remind the court of this change. Fairness
demands that this Court order a correction to Mr. Losee's sentence to avoid
such an injustice.
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Failure to sentence Mr. Losee correctly is clearly an error. The change
in the statute under which Mr. Losee was charged should have been obvious
to the trial court, whose job it is to know and apply correctly the laws of the
State of Utah. And, absent this error, it is highly likely the outcome for Mr.
Losee would be more favorable: i.e., he would be sentenced to the shorter
prison term.
It was plain error for the trial not to sentence Mr. Losee correctly, and
justice and fairness demand this Court should order he be so sentenced.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to
reverse the jury's finding Appellant was guilty of First Degree Solicitation to
Commit Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2011.

Robert L. Donohoe
Attorney for Appellant
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Sec. 10. [Powers denied the states.]
[1.] No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant
letters of marque and reprisal: coin money; emit bills of credit; make any
thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of
attainder, as post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, or
grant any title of nobility.
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts,
laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of
the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and
Control of the Congress.
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreements or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in
War. unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit
of delay.
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
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Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States
or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of

this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
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Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of
time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. iUvidence or otlier
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident,
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76-1-103.

Application of code — Offense prior
to effective date.
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the
construction of, the punishment for, and defenses
against any offense defined in this code or, except
where otherwise specifically provided or the context
otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this
code; provided such offense was committed after the
effective date of this code.
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective
date of this code shall be governed by the law,

statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment available under this code shall
be available to any defendant tried or retried after
the effective date. An offense under the laws of this
state shall be deemed to have been committed prior
to the effective date of this act if any of the elements
of the offense occurred prior thereto.
1973
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76-3-203.

F e l o n y conviction — Indeterminate
term of imprisonment.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree,
unless the statute provides otherwise, for a
term of not less than five years and which may
be for life.
(2) In the case of a felony of the second
degree, unless the statute provides otherwise,
for a term of not less t h a n one year nor more
than 15 years.
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree,
unless the statute provides otherwise, for a
term not to exceed five years.
2003
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76-4-203. Criminal solicitation — Elements.
(1) An actor commits criminal solicitation if with
intent that a felony be committed, he solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or importunes another person to engage in specific conduct that under

the circumstances as the actor believes them to be
would be a felony or would cause the other person to
be a party to the commission of a felony.
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section
only if the solicitation is made under circumstances
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent that the
offense be committed.
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the
person solicited by the actor:
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation;
(b) does not commit an overt act:
(c) does not engage in conduct constituting a
substantial step toward the commission of any
offense;
(d) is not criminally responsible for the felony
solicited;
(e) was acquitted, was not prosecuted or convicted, or was convicted of a different offense or of
a different type or degree of offense; or
(f) is immune from prosecution.
(4) It is not a defense under this section that the
actor:
(a) belongs to a class of persons that by definition is legally incapable of committing the offense
in an individual capacity; or
(b) fails to communicate with the person he
solicits to commit an offense, if the intent of the
actor's conduct was to effect the communication.
(5) Nothing in this section prevents an actor who
otherwise solicits, requests, commands, encourages,
or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense from being prosecuted and convicted as a party to the offense under
Section 76-2-202 if the person solicited actually commits the offense.
1993
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76-4-204. C r i m i n a l s o l i c i t a t i o n - P e n a l t i e s .
Criminal s o l v a t i o n t o c o m r u i t
(1) a c a p i t a l x e i o n , r a f c t a e g x
(2) ^
fe

W Y a second degree felony i , a third degree
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76-4-204. Criminal solicitation — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) Criminal solicitation to commit:
(a) a capital felony, or a felony punishable by imprisonment for life
without parole, is a first degree felony;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (l)(c) or (d), a first degree felony is
a second degree felony;
(c) any of t h e following offenses is a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for a n indeterminate t e r m of not fewer t h a n three years and
wThich may be for life:
(i) murder, Subsection 76-5-203(2)(a);
(ii) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; or
(hi) except as provided in Subsection (l)(d), any of the felonies
described in Title 76, Chapter 5, P a r t 4, Sexual Offenses, t h a t are first
degree felonies;
(d) except as provided in Subsection (2), any of the following offenses is
a first degree felony, punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than
15 years and which may be for life:

(i) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;
(ii) object r a p e of a child, Section 76-5-402.3; or
(hi) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1;
(e) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; a n d
(f) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor.
(2) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (l)(d), a court finds t h a t
a lesser t e r m t h a n the t e r m described in Subsection (l)(d) is in the interests of
justice and states t h e reasons for this finding on the record, the court may
impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
(a) ten years and which may be for life;
(b) six years and which may be for life; or
.;•
(c) three years and which may be for life.
History: C. 1953,- 76-4-204, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 189, § 2; 2008, ch. 179, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amendment, effective May 5, 2008, designated the
opening phrase as (1); redesignated former (1)
and (2) as (l)(a) and (l)(b); in (l)(a), added "or a

felony punishable by imprisonment for life
without parole"; in (l)(b), added "except as
provided in Subsection (1X0 or (d)"; added
(l)(c) and (l)(d); redesignated former (3) and (4)
as (l)(e) and (l)(f); and added (2).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM XI

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

76.5-202. Aggravated m u r d e r
d e ^ i f t i j ^ r 1 n°m]Cldfe institutes a«~av«w
a
Y t n e a c tor mtentionallv n- l
'Tn 0g *:^
t e c muri y cause
death of another U Un CdLl r a m - ^ J f ° ^
^ th«
stances:
**> <* the following C l r c u ^
g ) Aggravated murder is a capital f e W .
2005

76-5-202. A g g r a v a t e d m u r d e r .
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the
r ,-up followmg circumdeath of another under anv of .he
stances:

'3) (a) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated murder is a capital felony
(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty has not been filed, aggravated murder is
a noncapital first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for life without parole or by an
indeterminate term of not less than 20 years and
which may be for life.
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